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This paper utilizes recent research developments in portfolio balance 
theory and in real exchange-rate  instability to synthesize,  update, and test 
the optimum currency area (OCA) theory.  Four hypotheses,  capturing the 
central features of the OCA theory,  are advanced and tested in a 
multinomial-logit  setup.  The empirical results establish the linkage  between 
a fixed rate and financial integration,  trade integration,  plus inflation 
convergence.  The Mundell-Fleming  ranking of regime is refuted in a 
fundamental way.  These findings are applied to a discussion of European 
monetary integration, in relation to both its final objective and its 
intermediate procedure. 
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The Single European Act, amending the Treaty of Rome,  became effective in 
July 1987.  This act envisages the ending of all remaining restrictions on the 
intracommunity flow of goods, capital,  and labor in Europe by 1992.  However, 
the recommendation of the Delors Report for the intermediate procedures and 
the final goal of European monetary union is facing objections from Britain 
and raising concerns among other members of the European Economic Community. 
In  an area of increasing financial and trade integration,  what is the 
appropriate choice of an exchange-rate  regime?  This question can  be addressed 
in the context of the optimum currency area (OCA) theory,  which provides 
criteria for different types of countries to choose between floating and fixed 
exchange-rate  regimes. (Useful reviews of the OCA theory can be found in 
Ishiyama [1975],  Tower and Willett [1976],  and Obstfeld [1985].) 
The OCA theory,  however,  has not incorporated more recent development of 
the portfolio-balance  theory and recent research on real exchange-rate 
instability under a nominal floating exchange-rate  regime.  Moreover, existing 
empirical studies of the OCA theory have generally confirmed the linkage 
between trade integration and a fixed rate,  but have found the linkage between 
financial integration and exchange-rate  regimes to be blurred (see Dreyer 
[1977],  Heller [1978],  Holden,  Holden,  and Suss [1979],  and Weil  [1984]).  In 
an environment of rapid,  advanced telecommunication and liberalization of 
capital control, financial markets are increasingly linked worldwide.  l  It 
is important to investigate the linkage between financial integration and 
exchange-rate  regimes more closely. 
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empirical study in light of more recent research developments.  These 
developments help strengthen the linkage between the fixed rate and financial 
integration.  The empirical evidence from this paper supports this theoretical 
linkage,  resulting in the refutation of the Mundell-Fleming  ranking of 
exchange-rate  regimes.  Three characteristics--financial  integration, trade 
integration,  and inflation convergence--are  identified empirically as 
important criteria for a country to consider in choosing its own exchange-rate 
regime.  These findings are used in this paper to analyze European monetary 
integration.  The multinomial-logit  analysis in this study highlights the 
complicated nature of multiple-regime selections. 
11. THE (EXTENDED) OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY 
This section reviews,  synthesizes,  and updates OCA theory.  Four 
hypotheses and their antitheses,  which capture the central features of the OCA 
theory,  are developed.  These hypotheses are related to financial integration, 
trade integration,  inflation convergence,  and labor mobility. 
Mundell (1963,  1964) and Fleming (1962) examined the effect of the 
exchange-rate  arrangement on stabilization  policies.  The Mundell-Fleming 
(M-F)  proposition established in their work has proved its sustaining power 
for the last 25 years.  According to Dornbusch (1988): 
The Mundell-Fleming  model ...  continues virtually unchallenged 
today. Of course,  the models we use today have gone further in 
separating short run and long run,  in allowing a role for 
expectations,  and in taking into account the consequences of trade 
imbalances for asset accumulation.  Even the stock market has now 
become a part of the wider model.  But the conclusions remain close to 
those of the Mundell-Fleming  model. 
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relative to exchange rates,  and that capital mobility is a central factor in 
the transmission of business cycles.  Their proposition is: 
(1) In  a small,  open economy with perfect capital mobility (perfect 
asset substitution and instantaneous portfolio adjustment), 
monetary policy is ineffective in changing output under a fixed 
exchange rate because monetary expansion or contraction causes 
incipient interest-rate  changes and the offsetting capital flows; 
(2) In a small,  open economy with perfect capital mobility, fiscal 
policy is ineffective in changing output under a floating exchange 
rate,  because the induced exchange-rate  change causes 
trade-balance  adjustment that offsets the fiscal policy; and 
(3) If the country is large or capital mobility is imperfect,  each 
policy retains some effectiveness due to the wedge between 
domestic and world interest rates,  although the qualitative 
content of (1) and (2) remains important. 
While the M-F proposition on relative policy effectiveness remains valid, 
it is always generalized according to the ranking of exchange-rate  regimes. 
The effectiveness of monetary policy is often the central criterion for 
choosing a nominal exchange-rate  regime,  resulting both from the relative 
flexibility of monetary policy and from the monetary authority's ability to 
determine the exchange-rate  regime.  We can thus form our first maintained 
hypothesis  : 
H,:  Under increasing financial integration (or capital mobility),  a 
floating-rate  regime (or more exchange-rate  flexibility) is 
preferred for the sake of monetary autonomy. 
On the other hand,  as financial integration increases,  monetary and asset 
shocks in one economy transmit rapidly and widely to other economies.  This 
diffusion of disturbances causes exchange-rate  instability and volatile 
expectations that, in turn,  render monetary autonomy less viable and spill 
over to real sectors.  Therefore,  a fixed exchange-rate  regime would be 
preferred. 
To illustrate,  we can consider different theories under the rubric of the 
portfolio-balance  models.  In these models, the nominal exchange rate is an 
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empirical basis of this assertion is that marketable world wealth can  be 
counted in trillions of dollars;  even a small shift in asset preference can 
lead to a capital transfer that is much larger than what can be effected 
through the current account.  Also,  asset price adjusts much faster than goods 
price.  Therefore,  the nominal exchange rate is sensitive to changes in  the 
supply and demand of monies and securities. 
Moreover, international portfo.1io preferences themselves become more 
volatile with a floating exchange rate.  Market participants form their 
exchange-rate  expectations based on speculations of future monetary,  fiscal, 
and exchange-rate  policies according to news and guesses.  This 
forward-looking  expectation can  be highly unstable if the authorities do not 
commit themselves to maintaining the exchange rate along a predetermined path. 
Besides the auction-market  nature of the foreign-exchange  market, some 
other theoretical arguments contribute to exchange-rate  instability under a 
floating-rate  regime:  (1) overshooting due to instantaneous exchange-rate 
adjustment to restore asset-market  equilibrium when output and price adjust 
slowly over time; (2) expectation  errors due to wrong beliefs or insufficient 
use of  market information; (3)  a bandwagon effect (jump-in  of more 
speculators) without sufficient economic rationale; (4) rational bubbles due 
to persistent shocks in one direction;  and (5) irrational bubbles due to 
insufficient  speculation. 
The autonomy of  monetary policy is weakened under these unstable 
circumstances,  which are exacerbated by increasing financial integration. 
McKinnon (1982) argued that volatile exchange-rate  expectation can  cause 
domestic (real) money-demand  instability either through direct M1 currency 
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anticipated exchange-rate  change,  or (more importantly) through indirect 
impact on domestic- and foreign-bond  yields that, in turn,  will induce 
international capital flow because of bond arbitrage in a highly mobile 
international bond market.  Assuming money-market  equilibrium, the domestic 
inflation rate is the difference between the growth rate of nominal money 
supply and real money demand.  Thus,  domestic price stability cannot be 
achieved through independent monetary policy (without accommodating money 
demand changes) provided by a floating rate.  Therefore,  direct or indirect 
currency substitution  will constrain monetary policy autonomy even if monetary 
policy independence is granted.4 
Also, under high financial integration,  the government's control of credit 
has already been undermined due to the huge inflow and outflow of capital. The 
unregulated Eurocurrency market, or any comparatively unregulated financial 
intermediaries,  would contribute to this effect.  Considering the monetary 
interdependence under a floating-rate  regime and the leverage of monetary 
policy that exists under a fixed-rate  regime (for large countries and in the 
case of imperfect capital mobility),  the benefit of a floating rate and the 
corresponding monetary independence should not be overstated. 
Moreover, Stockman (1983) and Mussa (1986) found that a nominal 
floating-rate  regime is associated with greater real-exchange-rate  variability 
as compared to a nominal fixed-rate  regime.  Mussa attributes this phenomenon 
to differential speeds of adjustment in asset and goods markets, while 
Stockman points out the possible importance of real shocks in an equilibrium 
model. 
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exogenous shocks,  and thus may well maximize national welfare.  If there is 
some price rigidity,  however, a floating exchange rate may not be optimal.  A 
major reason is that real exchange-rate  instability would incur costs in 
international trade and finance.  The instability can  be distinguished in 
terms of volatility and misalignment.  Volatility is the short-term 
fluctuation of nominal or real exchange rates about their long-term  trends. 
Misalignment refers to a sustained deviation from the fundamental equilibrium 
real exchange rate (FER).  FER has been defined as the purchasing power parity 
rate or as the rate that generates a current account surplus or deficit equal 
to the underlying capital flow over a cycle (Williamson [1985]). 
Volatility increases the uncertainty associated with international trade 
and finance and may discourage these transactions.  If the forward market can 
be used to hedge the exchange risk,  a hedging cost will be incurred. 
Moreover,  hedging cannot be perfect because the timing and magnitude of a 
firm's foreign-exchange  needs may not be predictable.  Some empirical works 
(especially those using earlier data) showed little evidence of trade 
interruption (see International Monetary Fund staff [I9841 and the survey 
therein).  Bailey and Tavlas (1988) find that effective exchange-rate 
volatility is insignificant in affecting aggregate real exports.  However, 
what matters in the short run is the impact of bilateral exchange-rate 
volatility on bilateral trade.  On that account,  most recent studies based on 
bilateral trade and bilateral exchange-rate  data find significant effects 
(see,  for example,  Thursby and Thursby [I9871 and Cushman [1988]). 
So far as the author can tell, there are only two published studies of 
exchange-rate  volatility on international finance (Cushman [I9851 and Bailey 
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insignificant effect of exchange-rate  risk on direct investment.  These 
results are consistent with the model that states,  in response to risk,  that 
multinational firms concentrate more on the home market, but offset this 
somewhat by increasing foreign capital input and production.  However, direct 
investment is only one form of international financial flow.  Others, such as 
bank credit and deposit,  bond finance,  and portfolio investment, should also 
be investigated.  These forms of finance do not possess the special 
characteristics of direct investment as stated above. 
Misalignment may incur significant costs in finance and trade.  Long-term 
foreign lending cannot be well-hedged  because short-term  hedging on a 
noncontingent  basis covers only a small portion of the potential long-term 
risk,  and the transaction costs and the moral hazard associated with contract 
enforcement of long-term  contingent futures would be prohibitive (McKinnon 
[1988]).  Therefore,  long-term  lending and investment may be severely affected 
by misalignment. 
Misalignment may also cause serious deindustrialization effects. 
Production facilities  may be mothballed or scrapped,  and the reentry fee may 
be prohibitive.  The resulting unemployment is also costly.  Moreover, 
resources will shift back to the original sector when the exchange-rate  change 
reverses its direction, thus incurring more costs.  Protectionist legislation, 
which often occurs during the process of deindustrialization,  imposes costs on 
consumers throughout the economy. Marston (1988) provides a case study for the 
sterling misalignment (1979-82)  and the dollar misalignment (1981-85), finding 
significant disruptive effects on the tradeable sector. 
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instability,  which may well incur costs on international trade and finance. 
Also,  the link between financial integration and a fixed rate is further 
strengthened for domestic economic stability. 
With regard to domestic stabilization,  macroeconomic performance can  be 
evaluated in terms of variation of output and general price level relative to 
their trends.  Assuming the authorities cannot directly observe the source of 
the disturbances,  or if the macropolicy measures are uncertain in effect or 
costly to use, then the optimal nominal exchange-rate  regime functions as an 
automatic stabilizer for the economy,  yielding the best macroeconomic 
performance on average. 
More financial integration increases the need for stabilizing financial 
shocks.  Domestic money-supply  shock will be ineffective to change domestic 
output under a fixed rate (M-F  proposition).  The same stability can be 
reached by a foreign  country if it adopts a fixed-rate  regime.  Changes in 
money or asset demand will lead to changes in interest rates and exchange 
rates that,  in turn,  will affect domestic and foreign  output.  A fixed rate 
can prevent the spillover from financial sectors to real sectors.  The 
risk-sharing  consideration suggests that the two regions would prefer a fixed 
rate,  together with appropriate international settlement arrangements 
(Obs  tfeld [I9851  ) . 
Therefore,  although the M-F  proposition on policy effectiveness may remain 
valid (but weakened),  it is relatively less important in determining an 
exchange-rate  regime.  We can summarize the above discussions as our 
alternative hypothesis  : 
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(or lower exchange-rate  flexibility) is preferred both because 
monetary autonomy is constrained and because the impact of 
stochastic disturbances on international trade, international 
finance,  and domestic output can  be stabilized. 
The second hypothesis is the existence of a link between trade integration 
and a fixed exchange-rate  regime.  Under the rubric of trade integration,  we 
can incorporate a country's economic size,  the relative importance of its 
foreign-trade  sector (openness), and its trade pattern (commodity and 
geographic concentration).  These are associated concepts because a small 
country usually has limited resources.  Therefore,  it must specialize in order 
to exploit economy of scale,  and it requires openness in order to diversify 
its consumption  bundle and to earn sufficient foreign exchange to pay for it. 
In a small,  open economy,  the exchange  -rate  adjustment mechanism tends to 
be less effective.  To restore balance-of-payment  (BOP) equilibrium, 
exchange-rate  adjustment needs to change the relative prices between domestic 
and foreign goods (terms of trade [TOT]) and between tradeable and 
nontradeable goods.  A small country has little market power to influence its 
TOT,  however.  An open economy needs more price adjustment between sectors, 
which is often difficult to achieve because of more effective pass-through 
from a nominal exchange-rate  change to domestic price (McKinnon [1963]). 
A small country often does not have a well-developed  financial market. 
Monetary policy independence does not assure its effectiveness,  because open 
market operation is less viable.  Also, a small country may face more 
exchange-rate  fluctuations because its foreign-exchange  market is thin. 
Because the tradeable sector is relatively important for an open economy, 
the economy will incur more costs from exchange-rate  volatility and 
misalignment.  Also, a relatively open economy is easier to adjust to external 
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Furthermore, the lack of money illusion in an open economy and the downward 
rigidity of wage rates will cause depreciations to raise labor costs more than 
equivalent appreciations will lower them.  Also,  monetary and fiscal expansion 
is more likely to occur in a more open economy where the deindustrialization 
effect of appreciation is more serious.  Therefore, in a regime of fluctuating 
exchange rates,  world inflation would be ratcheted up. 
A more undiversified economy (in terms of commodity variety) will 
experience more exchange-rate  changes  because microshocks (supply-demand 
changes of individual goods) to the export sector do not cancel each other 
out.  As discussed earlier, exchange-rate  change is more costly in  a small, 
open (undiversified) economy.  Constant exchange-rate  change will be even more 
costly.  Therefore,  a fixed rate is preferred. 
Another type of diversification is related to geographical factors.  When 
a country finds that a large share of its exports are sold to only one or to 
very few countries,  a case can  be made for maintaining its exchange rate 
pegged to a single country's currency (or to relatively few countries' 
currencies) in order to promote trade. 
We can summarize the effect of increasing trade integration as the second 
maintained hypothesis: 
H,  :  Under increasing trade integration,  a fixed-rate  regime is 
preferred for the sake of less inflation and lower costs in trade 
and in BOP adjustment. 
However, there are alternative cases based on stabilizing real shocks.  In 
a small,  open economy, the real disturbances originating in external sectors 
are likely to dominate real disturbances of domestic origin.  External real 
demand disturbances tend to move the BOP and the domestic economy in the same 
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external equilibrium simultaneously.  This dilemma makes a case for a 
flexible-rate  regime (Whitman [1967]).  (A floating rate also tends to better 
stabilize domestic real demand disturbances,  parallel to the M-F  proposition 
on fiscal-policy  ineffectiveness.)  For the real external supply shocks,  such 
as productivity or technology shocks in the tradeable sector,  differential 
wage and price trends would be developed.  A small,  open economy will face 
more international commodity arbitrage and more pressure for either an 
exchange-rate  or a wage-price  adjustment.  Then exchange-rate  change provides 
the least costly route that prevents wealth or relative-price  effects from 
taking place (see Friedman [I9531 and Kravis and Lipsey [1983]).  Thus,  we 
have the alternativehypothesis: 
H,*  :  Under increasing trade integration,  a floating-rate  regime is 
preferred for the sake of stabilizing real shocks in the least 
costly way. 
Aside from the impact of financial integration,  the insulation from 
external (especially inflationary) shocks allows the authority to pursue 
domestic macroeconomic targets.  In the long run,  a floating exchange rate 
provides more policy independence than a fixed rate.  Even though the 
historical records attribute more variable and generally higher inflation to 
the floating-rate  regime,  it is likely to be caused by multiple policy goals 
or policy imprudence and does not negate the ability of independent monetary 
policy to pursue a domestic inflation target (see evidence provided by Darby 
and Lothian [1989].) However,  concern about reduced monetary independence 
under a fixed-rate  regime is most pronounced in countries with either 
relatively high or relatively low inflation rates. 
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relatively heavy reliance on an inflation tax.  Lower inflation rates will 
reduce the government's seigniorage revenue and complicate its already 
difficult fiscal problems.  Therefore,  a flexible exchange rate is preferred. 
Low-inflation  countries generally are concerned that under a fixed, 
disequilibrium exchange rate,  heavy exchange-market  intervention and massive 
capital flows would prevent effective control of their money supply. 
Therefore,  these countries  would lose both their price-stability  objective and 
their hard-won  anti-inflationary  reputations.  They would suffer rather than 
gain from monetary linkage to foreigners (see Frenkel and Goldstein [1988]). 
Thus,  we have our third maintained hypothesis: 
H, :  With divergent inflation rates,  a floating-rate  regime is 
preferred for the sake of seigniorage and for the ability to 
maintain national price stability. 
Alternatively,  a fixed-rate  regime provides valuable anti-inflationary 
discipline.  Under a fixed-rate  regime,  the government will be more prudent in 
macro-policy  management for fear of losing political support as a result of 
lost reserves and huge exchange-rate  changes.  Also, government officials may 
spur labor union leaders and businessmen to join the fight against inflation 
by citing the danger of the BOP crisis.  This is especially true when 
coordination can help rectify the externality caused by the spillover when one 
country's policies affect other countries' targets and when price-stability 
objectives are convergent  among regions.  An interpretation of the EMS is that 
high-inflation  France and Italy borrow the anti-inflation  reputation from 
low-inflation  Germany.  Therefore: 
H,~  :  With divergent inflation rates and convergent low 
inflation-rate  consensus,  a fixed rate is preferred in order to 
provide external discipline on inflation. 
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(capital and labor) mobility.  Capital mobility has been discussed earlier. 
In regard to labor mobility,  without prompt and complete pass-through,  nominal 
depreciation causes real depreciation and may cause factors to move from 
nontradeable-goods  production to tradeable-goods  production.  Labor mobility 
within a country directly influences the efficiency with which resources can 
be transferred between sectors.  The accompanying adjustment costs under a 
floating-rate  regime will be lower for a country with higher internal resource 
mobility.  On the other hand,  BOP adjustment under a fixed-rate  regime often 
adopts the mechanism of overall deflation or inflation.  Some factors simply 
will not be used.  Labor movement between sectors will not change the 
situation (see McKinnon [1963]).  Therefore,  we have the fourth maintained 
hypothesis: 
H, :  Under high labor mobility, a floating rate is preferred for the . 
sake of relatively low cost of adjustment within a region (country). 
However, in a currency area,  interregional labor movement helps the 
adjustment of a depressed region by changing its pattern of production and 
resource allocation.  Costly areawide price inflation is not needed to inflate 
away pockets of unemployment.  Therefore,  high labor mobility among countries 
promotes the formation of a currency area (see Mundell [I9611 and Tower and 
Willett [1976]).  Interregional labor mobility and labor mobility within a 
region are often correlated.  The maintained hypothesis emphasizes the latter 
mobility.  If we,  in turn,  emphasize the former mobility,  we have: 
H,*:  Under high labor mobility, a fixed rate is preferred for the 
lower interregional adjustment cost. 
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mobility within a country is already difficult,  which is even more true 
concerning mobility across borders.  Moreover,  mobility due to homogeneity of 
occupation (for example, movement within the automobile industry) may not be 
useful because the whole industry may face the same drop in demand.  On the 
other hand,  mobility compatible with diversity of occupation  would be rather 
unlikely (Ishiyama [1975],  Yeager [1976]).  Therefore,  labor mobility would be 
an insignificant factor in determining exchange-rate-regime  choice.  However, 
in the Mundell tradition,  we still incorporate it and test its significance. 
111. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
A.  The Lonit Model 
To test the (extended) OCA theory,  a logit model is built that uses 
country characteristics to explain the exchange-rate-regime  choice.  An 
independent-shock  term is not incorporated.  A reason is that 
exchange-rate-regime  choice is a medium-term (at least for several  years) 
choice based on anticipated shock patterns.  The correct way to separate and 
specify the shock terms is unclear.  More important,  trade integration (which 
is more susceptible to transmission of real shocks) and financial integration 
(which is more susceptible to transmission of financial shocks) themselves 
have already implied a circumstance with specific sources of shocks 
anticipated to occur more frequently.  These implied circumstances  have been 
embodied in the hypotheses to be tested,  based on country characteristics. 
Melvin (1985) provides an empirical study of exchange-rate-regime  choice 
based on two types of disturbances: domestic money shocks and foreign price 
shocks.  Disturbance terms are created as the standard errors of second-order 
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supply from 1976 to 1978.  Melvin finds that these shock terms have a 
significant impact on exchange-rate-regime  choice.  It is not clear,  however, 
how the current-period  unexpected shocks can be used to explain the 
exchange-rate-regime  choice that is based on anticipated shocks for 
several future periods.  Moreover,  his shock terms may be correlated with 
country characteristics. 
The actual regime choice (the dependent variable) can  be classified into 
several major categories,  while the explanatory variables are continuous 
measures of country characteristics.  For logit models, the relative odds of 
choosing a discrete regime can be represented by a linear combination of 
explanatory variables,  where the coefficients are the maximum likelihood 
estimates (MLE) . 
B.  The Exchange-Rate  Regime (Dependent Variable) 
A discrete qualitative measure for exchange-rate  flexibility is used for 
the dependent variable.  The measure is defined according to International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) classification of the exchange-rate  practices of member 
countries contained in the IMF's 1977 and 1980 annual reports.  Data from 1977 
are employed so that we can compare our results with those of several major 
studies that use 1977 data;  data from 91 countries are represented.  Data from 
1980 are employed so that we can compare a country's exchange-rate-regime 
choice behavior over time;  data from 88 countries are represented.  While 
using data from the 1980s would better reveal the current trend, one should 
note that many developing countries fell into arrears in the 1980s.  Those 
countries adopted flexible exchange rates simply because they ran out of 
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practical nature rather than a reflection of the choice based on country 
characteristics (see Quirk [1989]) 
The dependent variables in terms of ascending order of flexibility are: 
(a)  Narrow Margin Peg  (NMP) :  Maintains the exchange rate within 
a margin of less than 2.25% of the 
central rates,  for a single currency 
or for a basket of currencies. 
(b)  Wider Margin Peg  (WMP) :  Maintains a margin greater than 2.25% 
of the central rates. 
(c)  Crawler  (C)  :  Changes rates discretely according to 
a set of predetermined indicators. 
(d)  Group Float  (GF)  :  EMS (snake) countries,  which maintain 
within-group  rates up to a 2.25% 
margin and between-group  rates 
without a margin. 
(e)  Independent Float  (IF)  :  Does not maintain exchange rates 
within a specific margin. 
Here (a)  and (b)  can be subsumed under "peg,"  while (c),  (d),  and (e) can 
be subsumed under "float." 
The dependent variable can  be viewed as the revealed preference of the 
authorities regarding the exchange-rate  flexibility adopted.  It should 
reflect the underlying cost-benefit  calculations. 
The second amendment of the IMF's Articles of  Agreement came into effect 
on April 1,  1978.  It granted each member the right to choose its own form of 
exchange-rate  arrangement.  Intending not to categorize exchange-rate 
arrangements according to the previous adjustable-peg  system,  the IMF has not 
classified member countries in terms of narrow/wider margin peg practices 
since 1978.  Therefore, 1980 data are used in distinguishing  between countries 
that peg and countries that float. 
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The explanatory variables represent the factors thought to be important in 
determining the size of the benefits and costs of adopting any of the 
alternative regimes.  They are crucial country characteristics suggested by 
the (extended) OCA theory.  Data from 1977 and 1980 are used. 
X,  (FI):  The measure of financial integration is proxied by the ratio 
of commercial  bank holdings of foreign assets to central bank holdings of 
foreign  assets.  An increase in this ratio is presumed to indicate increasing 
depth in the foreign-exchange  market.  Central bank holdings of foreign assets 
is a  scale factor to standardize the FI measure.  The data are from 
International  Financial Statistics (IFS),  June 1981 and June 1984. 
X, (SIZE) :  Under the rubric of trade integratfon, four variables 
(SIZE,  OPEN,  CC,  and GC1) are created.  The dollar value of each country's  GNP 
is used as a measure of size.  The data are from World Bank Atlas,  1979 
and 1982. 
X,  (OPEN):  Concern about openness relates to foreign trade. The ratio 
of (Export + Import) over GNP is used as the measure.  GNP data are from the 
World Bank Atlas, 1979 and 1982.  Export and import data are from IMF 
Direction  of Trade,  1982. 
X,  (CC):  The measure of commodity concentration (CC),  the inverse 
measure of diversification,  is the ratio of the largest trade category to 
total trade from Standard International Trade Category (SITC) one-digit  data. 
It is derived from the U.N. Yearbook of International  Trade Statistics, 
1979,  1983,  vol. I: Trade by Nation. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmX5 (GC1):  The geographic concentration 1 (GC1) is the portion in total 
exports to the largest trading partner.  The data are derived from U.N. 
Yearbook of International  Trade Statistics, 1979,  1983,  vol. I: Trade 
by Nation. 
X,  (RIR):  The relative inflation rate (RIR) is calculated as the square 
deviation of a nation's CPI inflation rate from the world weighted-average  CPI 
inflation rate.  The world rate is a proxy for the inflation rate of the 
nation's trading partners.  The data are from E,  June 1979,  June 1982. 
X7 (LM):  The presence of domestic output originating in manufacturing 
can serve as a proxy for the degree of labor mobility (LM).  A higher value 
for this ratio is presumed to be associated with more developed markets and 
more labor mobility.  The data are from the U.N.  Yearbook of National 
Accounts Statistics, 1980 and 1983. 
IV.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A.  1977 Data 
The econometric results are reported here in two parts, using 1977 data. 
The first part examines the exchange-rate  .regime  selection problem with three 
alternatives:  narrow margin peg (NMP), wider margin peg (WMP), and float.  The 
second part reclassifies the countries involved into two categories: peg and 
float. 
(1) The Choice Among Narrow Margin Peg,  Wider Margin Peg,  and Float 
The maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of the coefficients are reported in 
equations (I), (2),  and (3).  Here the relative odds of regime 1 with respect 
to regime 2 are defined as the log value of Prob(regime  l)/Prob(regime  2). 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmNote: here we take the log values of the original independent variables as the 
independent variables in estimation.  Therefore,  the estimated coefficients 
can be interpreted as the elasticities of the relative odds with respect to 
the country characteristics. 
-  0.3296 log(LM)  -  6.929 Constant 
(-0.4713)  (-1.184) 
=  0.2557 log(F1)  -  0.1987 log(S1ZE)  log P  (Y-NMP) 
(1.582)~~  (-1.22) 
-  0.3647  log(0PEN)  + 0.0349 log(CC) 
(-1.727)"  (0.095) 
-  0.9184  log(GC1)  -  0.1736 log(R1R) 
(-2.867)***  (-2.055)** 
-  0.54  log(LM)  + 7.12 Constant 
(-1.04)  (1.575) 
Since log(P1/Pz)  - log(Pl/P3)  -  log(Pz/P3) 
where  P1=probability  of choosing float, 
Pz=probability of choosing wider margin peg,  and 
P3=probability of choosing narrow margin peg. 
We can derive equation (1.3) from equation (1.1) and (1.2): 
P(Y=Float)  - 
log  P(Y=wMP)  - -  0.6155 log(F1)  + 1.0113 log(S1ZE) 
+ 0.4934 log(0PEN)  -  0.4274  log(CC) 
+ 1.2447 log(GC1)  + 0.4677 log(R1R) 
+ 0.2104  log(LM)  -  14.049  Constant 
*@ Significant at 12% level 
*  Significant at 10% level 
**  Significant at  5% level 
*** Significant at  1% level 
Overall',  likelihood ratio index = 0.4293, 
likelihood ratio statistics = 85.84. 
From equation (I), the significant independent variables affecting the 
relative odds of selecting a float regime,  as compared to a NMP regime,  are 
FI,  SIZE,  and RIR.  Their signs show that an economy more integrated with the 
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regime,  and that an economy with a larger differential inflation rate from its 
major trading partners is more likely to choose a floating-rate  regime.  We 
label this as the conventional  view of the OCA theory. 
From equation (3), the conventional view on financial integration (FI) and 
inflation convergence (RIR) is significantly confirmed.  Also, the impact of 
trade integration is confirmed by the significant coefficient of SIZE. 
However, the significant  GC1 coefficient gives a different result (float is 
preferred to WMP).  A probable reason is that a country with geographically 
concentrated trade is susceptible to both microshocks and macroshocks from its 
main trading partner(s).  For microshocks,  exchange-rate  adjustment may be 
costly.  However, for macroshocks, such as marketwide price changes (inflation 
shocks)  , exchange  - rate adjustment is least costly.  Therefore,  when a floating 
rate (which provides sufficient flexibility) is a viable choice, it is 
preferred.  Thus,  an intermediate regime sometimes is less preferred to both 
extreme regimes and vice versa. 
From equation (2),  the significant variables affecting the relative odds 
of selecting the WMP,  as compared to the NMP,  are FI,  OPEN,  GC1,  and RIR.  The 
conventional views on trade integration (OPEN and GC1) are confirmed here. 
However,  FI and RIR have perverse signs that differ from the conventional 
view. 
The reason for the perverse sign of FI may be that WMP provides more 
short-run  flexibility,  which can better contain the exchange rate that 
maintains the asset-market  equilibrium. (An asset-market-clearing  exchange 
rate exhibits significant short-run  volatility because of the various reasons 
given in the section on the OCA theory).  Moreover, a wide band provides scope 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmfor anticyclical monetary policy.  When the money supply is increased to 
combat a depression,  for example,  exchange-rate  depreciation should be allowed 
to create an expectation for subsequent rebound that will compensate investors 
for temporarily low interest rates.  On the other hand,  WMP's  longer-run 
stability provides an anchor for expectations of a longer-term  exchange rate, 
thereby promoting stabilizing speculation  and greater stability of the 
exchange rate.  NMP enjoys stability similar to that of WMP in the longer run. 
In the short run,  however,  NMP is likely to be subject to much heavier 
speculative pressure and greater difficulty in accommodating anticyclical 
policies. 
The perverse sign of RIR can also be explained by the nature of WMP.  Both 
WMP and NMP do not provide sufficient flexibility in the long run for a 
country to choose its trend inflation rate.  In the short run,  however,  WMP 
does not provide as much anti-inflationary  discipline as NMP does.  Therefore, 
if a country chooses to peg its exchange rate,  NMP is preferred to WMP.  The 
empirical results show that the domestic inflation target is more important 
than the anti-  inflationary discipline (because float is preferred to peg) and 
that there are some (relatively weak) grounds for the discipline argument 
(because NMP is preferred to WMP). 
Though the intermediate regime (WMP) involves more complicated trade-offs, 
taking equation (I),  (2),  and (3)  together.,  a floating-rate  regime is 
preferred to a pegging-rate  regime (which can be either NMP or WMP)  for high 
RIR,  and a pegging regime is preferred to a floating regime for high FI,  both 
of which are compatible with the conventional view.  Overall, this evidence 
provides support for hypotheses H~*,  HZ,  and H3: 
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regimes is overridden  by the unstable nature of  a floating 
rate under increasing financial integration.  We shall 
elaborate on this result later. 
(Hz dominates H~~)  An economy facing more real shocks because of 
increasing trade integration still prefers a fixed rate 
because, in an economy open to trade,  a floating rate 
causes higher inflation and incurs more costs in BOP 
adjustment and trade. 
(HJ  dominates H~~)  A country with an inflation rate vastly different 
from its major trading partners tends to adopt a floating 
rate to preserve its domestic inflation target,  while the 
anti-inflationary  discipline from a fixed rate may provide 
fewer benefits. 
This three-alternative,  multinomial-logit  model simulates real-world 
choice among more than two alternative exchange-rate  regimes.  More important, 
the economic content of multiple-regime  selection is analyzed.  Overall, the 
likelihood ratio index (analogous to the multiple correlation  coefficient, 
R')  is 0.4293,  which is high among cross-sectional  data results.  The 
likelihood ratio statistic,  which tests the joint significance of all 
coefficients,  is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square  with 16 degrees of 
freedom (number of parameters to be estimated).  It is 85.84,  and is 
significant at 1 percent level.  The within-sample  prediction of regime choice 
has a  success rate of 72.53 percent. 
We can elaborate on  a major finding of this study now: "H~~  dominates 
HI."  That is,  high financial integration is shown to be associated with 
fixed-rate  regimes (WMP and NMP).  However,  previous works by Heller (1977, 
1978) and Holden,  Holden,  and Suss (1979) show a positive effect of CM (FI) on 
choosing a flexible exchange-rate  regime.  Nonetheless,  Heller employs 
discriminant analysis,  which does not provide a meaningful interpretation of 
the coefficients for hypothesis testing (t-test); Holden,  Holden, and Suss 
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employing a more complete set of explanatory variables,  and by using a 
multinomial-logit  method, this paper reaches quite different conclusions about 
FI  . 
According to the predominant Mundell-Fleming  proposition, only two of the 
three conditions can hold simultaneously: (1) monetary policy independence, 
(2) a fixed exchange rate,  and (3)  free capital mobility.  This proposition is 
often used as an argument that floating exchange-rate  regimes should be 
adopted in a financially integrated world.  However, the empirical results of 
this paper show that,  under high financial integration,  a fixed rate is 
preferred to a floating rate.  Thus,  the Mundell-Fleming  regime ranking is 
refuted. 
There are two major explanations, as discussed in the section on the OCA 
theory.  First, national monetary autonomy has already been eroded by high 
financial integration.  High capital mobility makes control of the money 
supply and credit difficult (with the possible exception of a resenre-currency 
country) and makes the demand for money unstable.  Even the independent 
monetary policy itself can be viewed as a monetary disturbance if neither a 
commitment nor a rule is attached.  Second,  under high financial integration, 
a fixed rate would be quite beneficial.  It can smooth the adjustment 
mechanism, lower the costs in international trade and finance,  and promote 
domestic stabilization. 
(2) The Choice Between Float and Peg 
In  order to provide a comparison  with the above multiple-regime-choice 
model and to provide a comparison with the model employing 1980 data (where no 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmWMP category is available),  a binomial-logit  model is used to study the choice 
between floating and pegging regimes.  The binomial results (using 1977 data) 
are  : 
=  -  0.2736 log(F1)  + 1.425 log(S1ZE)  log  $(Y=Peg) 
(-0.857)  (3.694)*** 
+ 0.3892  log(0PEN)  -  0.7905 log(CC) 
(0.8376)  (-1.389)' 
+ 0.6177  log(GC1)  + 0.2982 log(R1R) 
(1.185)  (2.247)** 
+ 0.2084 log(LM)  -  15.58 Constant 
(0.2237)  (-2.817)"""  (4) 
@  Significant at 18% level 
**  Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
where the numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics. 
The likelihood ratio index = 0.5960,  which is relatively high. 
The likelihood ratio statistic = 75.19,  which is significant at 
the 1 percent level. 
The significant coefficients,  SIZE and RIR,  both have signs compatible 
with conventional theory.  (CC is significant at the 18 percent level.) 
Compared with the three-alternative  model in the last section,  the hypothesis 
testing in this two-alternative  model does not incur any perverse sign (from 
the conventional OCA view) on significant coefficients.  This result is not 
surprising,  because the OCA theory was originally designed to distinguish the 
choice between floating and pegging regimes.  Also, there appear to be fewer 
significant coefficients in the two-alternative  model,  probably because there 
is a less-realistic  choice between only two regimes. 
The overall prediction rate is 89.01  percent,  which is higher than that in 
the three-alternative  model (72.53 percent).  The reason may be that,  with a 
finer and more detailed classification,  it is more difficult to make a 
clear-cut  choice.  The likelihood ratio index and statistic also are 
favorable.  We can summarize the overall performance in the above (three-  and 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmtwo-alternative)  models as satisfactory (better or much better than average). 
This indicates that the OCA country characteristics as a group can reasonably 
explain the behavior of the exchange-rate-regime  choice. 
We can also summarize the significance-test  results in the models above. 
Most of the significant coefficients  match the conventional  view of the OCA 
theory. (The three occasions of perverse signs have reasonable explanations.) 
Only the coefficient of LM  has never been significant (CC is significant only 
at the 18 percent level.  However,  it is significant at the 10  percent level 
by using 1980 data).  The insignificant LM seems to indicate that the effects 
of internal labor mobility (pro-floating  rate) and external labor mobility 
(pro-fixed  rate) cancel each other out;  or that labor mobility simply does not 
play a role in exchange-rate-regime  selection.  That is,  H,  and H,*  are 
not meaningful distinctions.  Moreover, RIR is significant in four out of four 
occasions.  FI and SIZE are significant in three out of four occasions,  while 
OPEN and GC1 are significant less frequently.  Although there are some 
insignificant coefficients,  significant coefficients do reveal the validity of 
the conventional OCA theory.  That is,  a country with the following 
characteristics is likely to join a currency area: (1) high financial 
integration, (2) high trade integration,  and (3)  inflation convergence with 
the area. 
B.  1980 Data 
The current monetary system emerged only after the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods System.  As time passes and experiences accumulate,  countries 
are supposed to become more capable of selecting their regimes according to 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmcost-benefit  considerations.  Thus,  we expect that more recent data will 
better reveal the validity of the OCA theory. 
Therefore,  we also employ 1980 data to reestimate the above models.  After 
selection and collection,  the 1980 data include 88 countries.  Our report will 
focus only on the choice between float and peg due to the lack of finer IMF 
classifications. 
The Choice Between Float and Pee 
Following the previous classification of countries into two cells,  one for 
float and one for peg,  we obtain the following binomial-logit-model  results: 
-  0.8161 log(0PEN)  -  2.084  log(CC) 
(-1.246)  (-1.827)" 
+ 0.0780  log(GC1)  + 0.2439 log(R1R) 
(0.1068)  (1.316)~ 
+ 0.4633  log(LM)  + 0.0564  Constant 
(0.6095)  (0.008) 
@  Significant at 18% level 
*  Significant at 10% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
Where the numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics. 
The likelihood ratio index = 0.5221. 
The likelihood ratio statistics = 63.69,  significant at 1 percent 
levels. 
The significant coefficients are those of SIZE and CC;  both have signs 
compatible with the conventional theory.  Adding to the 1977 data results,  the 
significant CC shows that a country with an undiversified composition of 
tradeable goods is likely to join a currency area.  FI and RIR are significant 
only at the 18 percent level,  with signs compatible with the conventional 
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1977 data (89.01  percent),  which appears to contradict the statement discussed 
in the beginning of this section.  A probable explanation lies in the 
disillusionment  with the floating exchange-rate  system.  By comparing the 
two-alternative  model (float versus peg),  we note that the significance levels 
of individual coefficients change as we move from 1977 data to 1980 data. 
While the significance level of RIR deteriorated from 5 percent to 18 percent, 
the significance level of FI improved from lower significance to significance 
at an 18  percent level,  and the level of significance of CC improved from 18 
percent to 10 percent.  This evidence seems to indicate that (1) RIR becomes 
less relevant,  probably due to incomplete insulation  under a floating-rate 
regime;  and (2) FI and CC become more relevant,  probably due to a perception 
change about the costs of exchange-rate  fluctuation on finance and trade. 
However, the OCA effect of individual country characteristics is still 
significant (with correct signs) by using 1980 data.  Furthermore, the 
international economic environment is changing.  For example, in 1980,  the 
United States adopted new monetary operating procedures, and a second oil 
shock had just occurred.  Both the disillusionment and the environmental 
change make the comparative costs of different exchange-rate  regimes less 
certain.  The country characteristic effect and model performance thus become 
blurred accordingly. 
V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In this paper,  we ask the same question that Heller (1977) did: 
Is the current international monetary system really a system, 
or is it a haphazard collection of ad hoc arrangements 
resulting from decisions by individual countries? 
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exchange-rate-regime  selection,  and the OCA theory provides acceptable 
criteria for that choice.  The empirical support comes from supportive 
significance-test  results and from reasonable model performance. 
In  agreement with previous empirical results,  this study confirms the 
relatively tight linkage between trade integration  and a fixed rate,  and 
between inflation convergence and a fixed rate.  However, labor mobility does 
not exhibit a,significant  impact on exchange-rate-regime  choice.  In contrast 
to previous (fuzzy) results,  this study confirms the linkage between financial 
integration and a fixed rate.  A direct implication is to refute the relative 
importance of the Mundell-Fleming  proposition on the exchange-rate-regime 
choice.  Therefore, the result indicates a research direction that emphasizes 
the potential importance of (direct and indirect) currency substitution and of 
the costs of exchange-rate  instability. 
The findings of this study can readily be applied to policy decisions. 
For western European countries attempting to form a currency area,  for 
example,  the important consideration lies in the degree of intracommunity 
trade and financial integration and on  whether there is a near-consensus  on a 
common inflation rate.  Prospective economic developments in western Europe 
seem to be favorable.  The 1992 economic goals promise an increasingly 
integrated Europe in trade and finance,  and all 12 European Community 
central-bank  governors endorse a low inflation policy.  Therefore,  the 
conditions in western Europe justify the formation  of a currency area. 
As for the intermediate procedure, the gradual approach as adopted in the 
Delors plan seeks to narrow the band successively and to reach full monetary 
integration gradually.  However,  our empirical evidence shows that, in an 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmincreasingly financially integrated world, if countries prefer pegging with a 
band, they should choose a wider band.  The gradualism suggested in the Delors 
plan is not compatible with the revealed preference of economic cost-benefit 
considerations.  Also, the speculative attack in the foreign exchange market 
would force misalignment and hinder the gradual approach. 
Our empirical evidence also shows that the inflation-rate  convergence 
favors a WMP.  On the other hand, increasing trade integration favors a NMP. 
However, in a time horizon of two to three years (1990-1992),  trade volume and 
prices may be sticky.'  Thus, increasing financial integration  would be the 
dominant factor because of the fast pace of adjustment in the asset market, 
the huge volumes of financial transactions,  and the earlier removal of 
investment barriers (by 1990) in the European Community.  However,  occasional 
parity adjustments may be needed to accommodate real shocks and policy 
differences.  The EMS tradition of striking a balance between rules and 
discretion thus is worth preserving. 
Therefore, in the transitional period,  EMS countries can adopt a 
hard-margin  wider band with adjustable parities.  The EMS can then jump to an 
irrevocably fixed rate,  or to a single currency, if substantial trade 
integration,  financial integration,  and monetary policy coordination have been 
achieved.  Alternatively,  EMS countries can fix their exchange rates 
irrevocably in the very early stage.  Eclecticism (gradualism) may only weaken 
the system. 
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1.  The United States liberalized its capital control in 1974;  Great Britain 
in 1979;  Japan in 1980;  and western Europe in 1990. 
2.  The Mundell-Fleming  ranking of the exchange-rate  regimes has been reversed 
by Fischer (1976) .and  by Frenkel and Aizenman (1983).  However, these studies 
mainly assume a financially closed economy,  which misses the central role of 
capital mobility.  Marston (1985) illustrates the importance of wage 
indexation.  Domestic full-indexation  will make fixed-rate  and floating-rate 
regimes indistinguishable.  Foreign full-indexation  will make foreign 
disturbances purely monetary.  However,  assuming there is a contractual lag of 
wage adjustment and a certain degree of capital mobility,  thus preserving the 
assumptions in the M-F  proposition, the M-F  ranking of the exchange regimes 
can still be reversed.  This is a main theme of this paper, which refutes the 
M-F  ranking in a fundamental  way. 
3.  Kareken and Wallace (1981) offer a rationale for unlimited M1 currency 
substitution.  Because fiat money is intrinsically useless,  unbacked,  and 
costless to produce,  the exchange rate,  as the relative price between two fiat 
monies, can be virtually anything.  This is also the case for corresponding 
world currency supply and currency composition. 
4.  National autonomy is often confused with national sovereignty.  The latter 
concerns the formal ability of a nation to act independently,  free from 
another nation's will,  such as monetary policy independence.  National 
autonomy,  in contrast,  is the ability of a nation to attain its objectives 
through unilateral action.  That is constrained in an interdependent world. 
5.  Henderson (1984) uses a small general-equilibrium  model to analyze 
exchange-market-intervention  policy.  He finds that for a single open economy, 
with disturbances to the home goods market, an aggregate (money supply) 
constant policy incurs less variation in output; for disturbances to financial 
markets,  a rate (exchange-rate  and interest-rate)  constant  policy also incurs 
less variation in output.  In a two-country  world economy,  Henderson finds 
that a fixed rate minimizes output variation for a preference shift between 
domestic and foreign assets.  On the other hand,  a floating rate minimizes 
output variation for a demand shift between domestic goods and foreign goods. 
6.  In  general,  it is difficult to assess the relative insulating properties 
of a floating rate versus a fixed rate without specifying the nature and 
origin of the disturbances and what variable and which sector are to be 
insulated.  These properties are often model-specific,  and there is a lack of 
theoretical consensus in this area (see Bordo and Schwartz [1988]). 
7.  Besides the J-curve  effect, the lack of sensitivity of trade volume and 
price to exchange-rate  variation can be the result of sunk costs.  Under 
exchange-rate  uncertainty, a firm will wait and see before it changes trade 
volumes and prices because of the significant irrevocable fixed costs involved 
(see Krugman [I9891  ) .  A practical reason for the insensitivity is the 
difficulty in meeting the requirement for common technical product standards. 
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